An invoice arrives from a supplier you know. The amount looks right, the work is complete, and the email includes a familiar conversation. There's just one change: the supplier wants payment sent to a different bank account.
That change deserves a pause. For an Atlanta business owner juggling customer calls, payroll, and a full inbox, it can look like routine bookkeeping. But sending a legitimate payment to a criminal's account can leave you short of cash and still owing the supplier.
A real invoice can carry false payment instructions
Payment fraud doesn't always start with a suspicious link. Someone may impersonate your vendor, take over a vendor's mailbox, or alter an invoice attachment. A criminal with access to an email conversation can copy the tone and timing of an expected request.
Correct invoice numbers and familiar signatures aren't proof that new banking details are genuine. Neither is a reply from the same email address. If that mailbox is compromised, you're asking the attacker to confirm their own instructions.
Make bank changes a separate approval
Set a written rule: staff cannot change a vendor's payment details based only on an email, invoice, text, or incoming call. Verify the change before updating the vendor record or scheduling payment.
- Call a known vendor contact using a number already in your records, established before the change request.
- Don't use the number in the new email, its signature, the revised invoice, or an attached bank letter.
- Ask whether the vendor requested the change. Confirm the account name, routing number, and account number through your approved verification process.
- Record who you contacted, which known number you used, when you called, and who approved the change. Protect records containing banking information.
If you can't reach the established contact, hold the change. Don't substitute a new contact supplied by the person requesting it. For a first payment, establish the vendor's identity and contact information independently before accepting banking instructions. Keep a controlled vendor contact list so employees don't have to search old emails under pressure. Limit who can edit that list. If a request changes both the phone number and the bank account, verify the contact change through your existing relationship before relying on the new number.
Give the second approver something to check
Two approvals help only when the second person does more than click a button. Separate the person who enters or changes vendor details from the person who approves them. Require dual approval for bank changes and outgoing wire or ACH payments, using bank controls where available.
The second approver should compare the payment with the verified vendor record, review the callback documentation, and check the invoice against the work or goods received. An approved invoice amount doesn't automatically approve a new destination for the money. Review the actual account details in the banking portal before release, not just the vendor's display name. A familiar name can sit beside an account number someone changed.
For a small office, the bookkeeper might prepare payments while the owner reviews and releases them. Use separate logins rather than sharing banking credentials. Name a backup approver for vacations, and decide in advance which payments must wait if nobody authorized is available.
Urgency doesn't cancel the callback
A request to wire money before the bank cutoff can make a normal check feel like an obstacle. So can a message that appears to come from the owner: "I'm in a meeting. Send this now and keep it confidential."
Apply the same checks to urgent ACH requests and executive instructions. Contact the requester through a known number, not contact details supplied in the message. Treat demands for secrecy or instructions to bypass approval as reasons to stop.
Tell employees explicitly that they won't be penalized for delaying a payment while verifying it. Owners need to follow that rule too. A process that disappears whenever the boss is busy won't survive a convincing impersonation.
If the money has already gone out
Contact your bank's fraud department immediately through a trusted number. Explain that you suspect payment fraud and ask about stopping, recalling, or recovering the wire or ACH transfer. Provide the transaction reference, amount, time, and destination details. Recovery is not guaranteed; don't wait for an internal investigation before calling.
- Preserve original emails, headers, attachments, approval records, and payment confirmations. Don't delete the conversation.
- Report the fraud promptly to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center at IC3.gov. Reporting doesn't replace contacting the bank.
- Notify the genuine vendor through a known channel and alert your IT provider. Pause related payments until you verify their instructions.
Support the payment process with safer email
Multifactor authentication, restricted mailbox access, and reviews of forwarding rules can reduce opportunities for email account abuse. They don't prove that banking instructions are correct. Keep the independent callback even when an email passes your security filters.
AVS Technologies' Microsoft 365 services are a place to start a conversation about protecting the email accounts your payment process depends on.
Want help reviewing where email security and payment approvals meet? Schedule a free consultation with AVS Technologies to discuss practical next steps for your Atlanta business.